Cost-Benefit Analysis of Unreliable System Protection Scheme Operation by Calvo, JL et al.
 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Unreliable System Protection 
Scheme Operation 
José Luis Calvo de Miguel 
Pedro Javier Ramírez 
Simon H. Tindemans 
Goran Strbac 
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
Imperial College London 
London, United Kingdom 
 
Abstract— System Protection Schemes (SPS) have the potential to 
greatly enhance the utilization of the network, often by 
automatically disconnecting generators in response to 
contingency events. However, malfunctions of such systems may 
expose the system to harmful blackouts. The operation of 
unreliable SPS is therefore subject to a cost-benefit balance 
between the benefits of increased system utilization and the risk 
of outages. This paper studies this trade-off in a year-round basis. 
The problem is firstly stated from a centralized perspective to 
probabilistically minimize the operational costs for a whole 
operating year. A case study based on a basic simple 
representation of the Great Britain system is considered. The 
results show great annual benefits from equipping the SPS with 
multiple generation disconnection systems, which are mainly 
associated with critical operating conditions. However, it is 
demonstrated that redundant SPS configurations do not 
necessarily reduce the levels of operational risk exposure. 
Index Terms—Cost-benefit analysis, probabilistic security 
standards, frisk assessment, system protection schemes 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
HE so-called SPS/SIPS/RAS (System Protection 
Scheme/System Integrity Protection Schemes/Remedial 
Action Scheme) are protection systems designed for 
detecting abnormal operating system conditions, typically 
contingency-related, and for initiating pre-planned corrective 
actions to mitigate the consequences of the abnormal condition. 
SPS actions rely on ICT infrastructure and typically include 
automatic generation disconnections, which are commonly 
known as generation rejection schemes [1] or intertripping 
schemes [2]. These corrective schemes allow system operators 
to keep acceptable system stability and power flows in post-
contingency scenarios without requiring to pre-constrain the 
network. This concept is opposed to the traditional 
deterministic ‘N-2’ security standard, which requires large 
transmission capacity margins in order to withstand the loss of 
one or two circuits without threatening the power system 
operation stability. As such, SPS have greatly facilitated the 
application of probabilistic security standards which seek to 
balance benefits and risks associated with different levels of 
network utilization and investment [3]. 
The potential benefits of SPS are especially important 
when large volumes of remote wind power generation are 
connected to the grid. In operational timescales SPS reduce the 
need for wind curtailment, which translates into system 
operating costs reductions. In the long term SPS defer costly 
transmission investments associated with wind generation 
projects [4]. As a result, there has been a growing interest in 
the use of SPS in order to facilitate a cost-effective integration 
of renewable generation. The Great Britain (GB) system is an 
example of a power system with remote renewable generation, 
as large volumes of wind power generation are connected in 
Scotland, while the demand is mostly concentrated in England. 
The Scotland-England transmission corridor consists of two 
AC double circuits, which will be complemented with two off-
shore HVDC lines, in order to increase the North-South power 
transfer [5]. However, National Grid -the GB system operator- 
could arrange commercial intertripping scheme contracts in 
order to enhance the utilization of this zone of the network [2].  
Obviously, the operation of SPS is not 100% reliable, and 
their utilization may expose the system to additional risks 
resulting from SPS malfunction. Ultimately, SPS failures may 
largely destabilize the system, resulting in harmful blackouts. 
In a survey conducted by IEEE-CIGRE in 1996 [6], 
stakeholders from the power industry assigned the cost from 
SPS failures to the highest cost category. SPS malfunctions 
have definitely contributed to cascading outages during the last 
decade, as happened in the Nordic network in 2005 [1]. 
Furthermore, SPS malfunctions have historically been more 
frequent than one could expect. For example, the NERC 
System Disturbance Reports from 1986-1995 [1] indicate that 
from the 30 cases that involved the operation of SPS, 21 were 
reported as successful operation of SPSs, while 9 involved 
operational failures. Therefore, the increasing use of SPS 
demands a better understanding of their impact, since 
undesirable SPS operations may result in the deterioration of 
the overall system reliability. 
A cost-benefit analysis of system protection scheme 
operations, based on a simple representation of the GB system, 
is presented in this paper. The analysis considers a set of 
representative operating conditions across the year, and the 
possibility for the system operator to arrange various 
intertripping schemes, at the expense of an annual capability 
fee. The problem is formulated from a centralized perspective 
to probabilistically minimize the intertripping capability fee 
payments, and the annual generation, protection and load 
curtailment costs for a whole operating year. Our case study 
shows that equipping the SPS with multiple intertripping 
schemes is associated with important annual benefits, 
especially when compared to system operations under the 
traditional ‘N-2’ security standard. The analysis shows that the 
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 main operational benefits are linked to stressed operating 
conditions characterized by bad weather and high demand and 
availability of wind outputs. It could be expected that 
contracting more intertripping schemes would reduce the 
levels of operational risk exposure; however, the inspection of 
the different cost components reveals that this is not 
necessarily the case within the probabilistic security 
framework considered in this paper. 
II.   PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Each year, the system operator solves a probabilistic 
optimization problem that seeks to minimize the total annual 
operating cost by arranging a number of intertripping scheme 
contracts with generating units. The problem has three types of 
operational decisions: 1) the number 𝑁 of generating units that 
will be under intertripping contracts for a year of operation; 
and for each operating condition 𝑘: 2) the dispatch of 
generators 𝒟$ and, 3) the operational configuration of the SPS, 
i.e. 𝒮$. The objective function of the problem solved by the 
system operator can be written then as follows: min),𝒟,𝒮 𝐶 + 𝐺$ + 𝑃$/ + 𝜆$,1𝑝3 𝑃$,1,34 + 𝑋$,1,33∈𝒪1∈𝒞$∈𝒦 ×𝒽$. (1) 
 
The constraints of the optimization problem are given by: 
 ℎ$ 𝒟$, 𝒮$ ≤ 0,	  	  	  	  ∀𝑘 ∈ 	  𝒦, (2) 𝑔$ 𝒟$, 𝒮$ = 0,	  	  	  	  ∀𝑘 ∈ 	  𝒦, (3) 𝒮$ ∈ 𝛴 N,𝒟$ ,	  	  	  	  ∀𝑘 ∈ 	  𝒦. (4) 
The objective function (1) includes the annual capability 
cost of the intertripping contracts (𝐶 𝑁 , first term), and the 
costs associated with the different system operation conditions 
(second to fourth term). The costs associated with each 
operating condition 𝑘 are given by: a) the conventional 
generation cost (𝐺$ 𝒟$, 𝒮$ , second term); b) the availability 
fee of the protection services (𝑃$/ 𝒟𝑘, 𝒮𝑘 , third term); and, c) 
the fourth term that represents the expected value of the costs 
from contingencies. The costs associated to contingencies is a 
summation over all the possible contingencies 𝑐 ∈ 𝒞, weighted 
by their respective fault rates 𝜆𝑘,𝑐, followed by a summation 
over all the possible SPS outcomes 𝑜 ∈ 𝒪(𝑐, 𝒮) (including 
malfunctions), which are weighted by the probability of 
occurrence 𝑝𝑜 of each SPS outcome. For each contingency-
SPS-outcome pair, the utilization costs 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,𝑜𝑢  and load-shedding 
impact 𝑋𝑘,𝑐,𝑜 are included. Each operating condition is 
multiplied by 𝒽𝑘, which is the number of hours that such 
condition is expected to happen during the year. The 
optimization is subject to inequality and equality constraints on 
the power flows and the generation dispatch, i.e. constraints (2) 
and (3) respectively [7]. The last set of constraints (4) enforces 
that the SPS configurations in operational timescales are 
compatible with the intertripping schemes annually contracted 
and with the dispatch of generators.  
III.   CASE STUDY 
In this paper the key elements of a cost-benefit model are 
mentioned. The full model will be explained somewhere else. 
A.   Description 
Figure 1 illustrates the power system under consideration, 
which is a simplified representation of the GB system. The 
wind power generation is connected in North (Scotland), while 
the electricity demand is mostly concentrated in South 
(England). The power flows downstream through two identical 
double circuits, each divided in two sections. The 
representation then has a total of eight identical lines (L1…L8), 
each with a circuit rating of 1700MW [4]. The system is 
assumed to have ten wind farms of 2GW each as shown in Fig. 
1. Under the traditional ‘N-2’ security standard, the 
transmission system should not be overloaded in case of losing 
two transmission lines. Such scenario constrains the power 
transfer to 50% of the available transmission capacity.  
In order to allow power transfers beyond the ‘N-2’ limit, it 
is assumed that an SPS is installed. Upon the occurrence of a 
line contingency, the SPS disconnects the faulty lines and a pre-
programmed amount of wind generation in North, in order to 
reduce the power flows and thus avoid overloading the 
remaining transmission lines. A probabilistic security standard 
is assumed, therefore the power transfer is increased up to the 
point that the cost (including risk from the SPS malfunctions) 
associated with such levels of utilization exceeds the benefits.  
 
Fig. 1. 4-bus representation of the GB power system. 
An operating year is represented by a set 𝒦 of 200 
representative operating conditions [8]. Each operating 
condition 𝑘 is characterized by: a) a global demand factor (% 
of system peak demand) and available wind output factor (% 
of peak wind generation); b) weather conditions (good or bad); 
and, c) the number of hours during which each operating 
condition occurs over the year. It is assumed that in each 
operating condition the global available wind output is equally 
distributed across the ten wind farms.  
The system operator, as discussed in the previous section, 
solves the optimization problem described by equations (1) to 
(4). The system operator thus arranges a number of yearly 
individual intertripping contracts with the available wind farms 
located in North (i.e. 𝑁 = 1, 2, … , 10), which are consequently 
connected to the system protection scheme, at the expense of 
an annual capability fee. As a result, the system operator is able 
 to select wind farms throughout the year from those awarded 
with the intertripping agreement.  
B.   SPS failure and impact modelling 
As illustrated in Fig.2, the SPS is connected to the eight 
transmission lines of the corridor, and to the 𝑁 wind farms 
under the intertripping agreement. The system can be triggered 
by single and double circuit contingencies. In operational 
timescales the system operator selects a number of wind farms, 
i.e. 𝑛,  that are expected to be disconnected for any of these 
triggering events, being 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁. It is assumed that the system 
operator assigns an intertripping capacity 𝑠 evenly amongst the 
selected wind farms. Therefore, in operational timescales the 
configuration of the SPS is defined by the number of wind 
farms selected and the intertripping capacity assigned to them 
i.e. 𝒮 ≡ (𝑠, 𝑛). 
The relays, circuit breakers and logic controls can fail 
according to a hidden failure model [9] which results in an 
average availability of 0.981, 0.9925 and 0.998, respectively. 
Additionally, the communication links are assumed to have an 
average availability of 95%. The unavailability of these 
components to perform their function results in an abnormal 
operation of the SPS. For instance, the malfunction of the 
communication channel associated with one of the 𝑛 selected 
generators results in a loss of a fraction (1/𝑛) of the scheduled 
intertripping capacity 𝑠. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Connection diagram of the SPS components. Relays (connected 
to transmission lines) are in green, breakers in red, control in grey, and 
communication channels in yellow. 
As single and double line contingencies are considered, the 
SPS outcomes are characterized by the loss of one or two lines 
(local actions to isolate the faulty lines), as well as by the 
number of generators that are successfully tripped (remote 
actions to reduce power flows). The local result is represented 
by the label 𝑙 ∈ {1,2}, denoting single or double circuit outages 
respectively. The remote actions are represented by the number 𝑚 (𝑚 ∈ {0, … , 𝑛}) of generators that were successfully tripped. 
As the SPS can be triggered by single and double line faults, 
the outcomes are conditional on those events, which result in 
conditional probabilities (	  𝑝V/WX |𝑒) for an initiating event 𝑒 ∈{𝑒[, 𝑒\} (single or double line fault). The values of these 
probabilities depend on the number of wind farms selected, 
i.e.𝑛, and therefore they are internally computed by the 
optimization model described in the next section. 
The operation of the SPS results in a generation shortage. 
Then frequency-sensitive generators located in South restore 
the power balance within seconds. After the generation-
demand balance is restored, the power is re-routed over the 
operational transmission lines. If the post-SPS power flow 
exceeds the remaining capacity of the transmission corridor 
(5100 MW and 3400 MW for a single outage and a double 
outage respectively), the disconnection of the remaining lines 
is triggered, which isolates North from South (system splitting) 
and requires a second restoration in order to balance generation 
and demand within each zone. Such situation causes large 
involuntary load shedding in South. 
C.   Optimization model 
As stated in section II, the optimization model considers 
multiple operating conditions for addressing the operation of 
the power system in a year-round basis. This model is solved 
in Fico Xpress. The objective function is given by: 𝑚𝑖𝑛^,4_,`_,a`_,b,[,W 𝐶 + 𝐺$ + 𝑃$ + 𝑋$$ ×𝒽$,	   (5) 
which is subject to the definitions and constraints listed below. 
1)   SPS capability  
The SPS capability cost is computed as the number of annual 
intertripping contracts 𝑁 times a yearly capability fee 𝜋d of 
of £70000/year:  
 𝐶 ≡ 𝐶 𝑁 = 𝜋d ∙ 𝑁, (6) 
2)   Generation  
The generation cost [4] 𝐺$ is as a linear function of the 
dispatched output, i.e. 𝑔$,f, of each generator 𝑖: 
 𝐺$ ≡ 𝐺$ 𝑔$,f = 𝛼f𝑔$,ff . (7) 
The dispatched generating capacity should equal the total 
demand in North, i.e. 𝐷^, and South, i.e. 𝐷i, nodes: 
 𝑔$,ff = 𝐷$^ + 𝐷$i. (8) 
The North-South flow 𝑡$is subject to the maximum flow 𝑡:  
 𝑡$ = 𝑔$,ff∈^3bkl − 𝐷$^ , (9) 
 𝑡$ ≤ 𝑡. (10) 
The commitment of generating units is modelled as follows: 
 𝑔$,f ≥ 𝑔f𝑢$,f, (11) 
 𝑔$,f + ∆𝑔$,f ≤ 𝑔f𝑢$,f. (12) 
where 𝑢f represents the binary commitment status of each 
generator and Δ𝑔f the reserve capability from part-loaded 
generators in South constrained by:  
 0 ≤ Δ𝑔$,f ≤ ∆𝑔f,	  	  	  	  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ, (13) 
 Δ𝑔$,f = 0,	  	  	  	  	  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ, (14) 
 Δ𝑔$,ff = 𝑟, (15) 
 𝑟$ ≥ 1800𝑀𝑊. (16) 
The minimum value of the reserve 𝑟$ is 1800𝑀𝑊, but the 
system operator may decide to contract additional intertripping 
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 and reserve capacity if this is beneficial for reducing the total 
system costs. The additional capacity may be used to relax 
constraints on the intertripping capacity 𝑠$, given by:  0 ≤ 𝑠$ ≤ 𝑟$. (17) 
3)   System protection 
In the second term of the objective function (5), 𝑃 denotes 
the expected hourly cost of system protection services, 
consisting of frequency response, and SPS availability and 
utilisation fees. The availability cost is determined in advance 
by purchasing a response capacity 𝑟$ at a fee 𝜋/ of £30/MW/h. 
The actual SPS utilisation fees are unknown, as they depend 
on the stochastic occurrence of outages and the actual amount 
of generation tripped in response to these outages. Successfully 
tripped generation capacity is compensated with an utilisation 
fee 𝜋4 of £1000/MW/event.  𝜆[ and 𝜆\ are the rate of single circuit fault events in any 
one of the eight lines (occurrences/hour), and the common rate 
of double circuit fault events (occurrences/hour) in lines that 
are connected to the SPS on the same side of the intermediate 
buses (L1 and L2, L3 and L4, L5 and L6, L7 and L8), respectively. 
Their values depend on the weather conditions, as shown in 
Table I. The total rates (occurrences/hour) for each type of 
occurrence are then given by 𝜆vwk3k = 8𝜆[ and 𝜆vxk3k = 4𝜆\. 
Then, the system protection services associated with 
contingency 𝑘 can me calculated as follows: 𝑃$ ≡ 𝑃$ 𝑟$, 𝑠$, 𝑛$ =	  𝜋/ ⋅ 𝑟$ + 𝜋4 ⋅ 𝑠$ 𝜆vk3k 𝑚𝑛$ .V∈ {…WX∈ [,\v∈ vw,vx⋅ 𝑝V/WX |𝑒 (18) 
TABLE I.    FAULT RATES PROBABILITIES 
Weather scenario Outage order Fault rate (occ/h) 
fair single 3×10}~ double 3×10} 
bad single 1×10} double 1×10} 
Fault rates based on data from [4] 
The intertripping capacity assigned to a wind farm cannot 
be larger than its actual wind availability. As it is assumed that 
the total available wind output is equally distributed amongst 
the ten sites in the system, the previous can be expressed as 
follows:  
 𝑠$ ≤ 𝑛$×𝑤$×2𝐺𝑊. (19) 
4)   Risk 
The term 𝑋$ in the objective function represents the 
expected cost resulting from emergency load shedding, i.e. the 
risk. The risk is computed as the price of emergency customer 
disconnections, 𝜋 = £30000/𝑀𝑊/𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡, multiplied by the 
frequency of occurrence and the expected amount of load shed. 
The previous can be expressed as follows: 𝑋$ ≡ 𝑋$ 𝑡$, 𝑟$, 𝑠$, 𝑛$ =	  𝜋 𝜆vk3k 𝑝V/WX |𝑒V∈ {…WX∈ [,\v∈ vw,vx ⋅ Δ𝐷$,X,V 𝑡$, 𝑟$, 𝑠$, 𝑛$ . (20) Δ𝐷$,X,V(𝑡$, 𝑟$, 𝑠$, 𝑛$)	   denotes emergency load shedding 
(MW) as a consequence of system splitting. It is computed 
using binary auxiliary variables, i.e. 𝛿$,X,V, that reflects the 
presence of post-SPS overload conditions and 𝜂$ that has the 
value 1 only if (𝑡$ − 𝑟$) is positive. The value of Δ𝐷$,X,V(𝑡$, 𝑟$, 𝑠$, 𝑛$)	   is determined by the following set of 
equations: 
 𝑡$ − VW𝑠$ − 𝑡X ≤ 𝛿$,X,V𝑀, ∀𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚, (21) 
 𝑡$ − VW𝑠 − 𝑡X ≥ − 1 − 𝛿$,X,V 𝑀, ∀𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚, (22) 
 𝑡$ − 𝑟$ ≤ 𝜂$𝐾,  (23) 
 𝑡$ − 𝑟$ ≥ − 1 − 𝜂$ 𝑀,  (24) 
 Δ𝐷$,X,V ≥ 0, ∀𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚, (25) 
 Δ𝐷$,X,V ≤ 𝛿$,X,V𝑀, ∀𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚, (26) 
 Δ𝐷$,X,V ≤ 𝜂$𝑀, ∀𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚, (27) 
 Δ𝐷$,X,V ≥ 𝑡$ − 𝑟$ − 2 − 𝛿$,X,V − 𝜂$ 𝑀, ∀𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚, (28) 
 Δ𝐷$,X,V ≤ 𝑡$ − 𝑟$ + 1 − 𝜂$ 𝑀, ∀𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚. (29) 
where 𝐾 is a large positive number (constant). It must be noted 
that the optimisation problem given by equations (5) to (29) is 
non-linear due to the appearance of 𝑛$ in the denominators of 
(21) and (22). Because the number of wind farms of the case 
study is small i.e. 𝑁 = 1,… ,10, equations (5)-(29) are solved 
independently for each possible value of 𝑁 and  𝑛$ ≤ 𝑁 and 
the best solution is selected. 
D.   Results and discussion 
1)   Optimal number of intertripping contracts 
The following discussion is focused on the analysis of the 
system operational costs as a function of the annual number of 
intertripping contracts.  
 
Fig. 3. Percentage of annual savings as a function of the number of 
intertrippings contracted with respect to ‘N-2’ case. The lower graph is an 
enlargement for 𝑁 = 2,… ,10 only. 
In the base case scenario the system operator is subject to 
the traditional ‘N-2’ security standard and does not use the 
SPS. The total annual operational costs of the power system 
amount to £8391.4 million. Figure 3 shows the percentage of 
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 annual savings with respect to the base case scenario for the 
different number of possible intertripping contracts. The 
bottom plot in Figure 3 corresponds to a zoom of the top plot 
for 𝑁 ≥ 2. If the system operator decides to contract 
intertripping services with only one wind farm, the total annual 
system costs are reduced by 4.98% with respect to the base 
case scenario. In absolute terms, this translates into operational 
savings of about £417.9 million. The second intertripping 
contract provides extra savings of approximately 0.57%, which 
achieves savings of £462.36 million in absolute terms. 
Additional intertripping contracts continue to report further 
annual savings (approximately 0.007% of savings per contract 
in average), until the seventh contract, where the tendency 
changes and the total annual costs increase with additional 
intertripping arrangements. The optimal solution is therefore 
the acquisition of intertripping services from 7 wind farms. 
The total annual savings with respect to the ‘N-2’ base case 
amount to £468.8 million.  
Figure 4 plots the annual risk exposure as a function of the 
number of intertipping contracts. It could be expected that 
contracting more intertripping services would reduce the risk. 
However, Fig. 4 shows a non-trivial shape where this is not 
necessarily the case. Note for example that 𝑁 = 2 has 
associated M£23.7 compared to M£31.76 when 𝑁 = 7. 
 
Fig. 4. Annual risk as a function of the number of intertripping contracts. 
2)   Cost-benefit trade-off in critical operating conditions 
The analysis is now focused on understanding the reasons 
that have driven such unexpected results in terms of annual risk 
exposure. In order to do so, the operational results produced by 
the optimization model are inspected, hence observing 
important variations on risk exposure in eleven operating 
conditions, which in total amount to 127.7 hours. 
Table II shows the data associated with those eleven 
operating conditions for 𝑁 equals to 1, 2 and 7. In particular, 
the table shows: demand and wind level, power transfer (T), 
intertripping capacity and number of wind farms selected (𝑆), 
and risk (𝑋). The meaning of ‘CS’ will be explained later. It 
must be noted that this is a set of stressed conditions because 
they are characterized by bad weather, high demand and 
medium/high availability of wind output. In general terms, 
these are associated with a strong economic incentive to let 
wind farms in North satisfy the demand in South. However, 
due to the bad weather condition there is a relatively high 
probability of facing line outages, which may lead to higher 
risk exposure.  
The weighted average transfer in these operating 
conditions (weighted by the number of hours of each of 
condition) is 5027, 6306 and 6391 MW for	  𝑁 equals to 1, 2 
and 7, respectively. As the number of available intertripping 
contracts increases, the optimization allows larger power 
transfers through the transmission corridor, in order to greatly 
satisfy the demand in South. The utilization of the SPS, 
measured as the weighted average of intertripping capacity 
(MW) committed and the number of wind farms selected, also 
increases from 718.7 and 0.48, to 1809 MW and 3, and 1807 
MW and 7 selected units, for one two and seven intertripping 
contracts respectively. These results show that the average 
utilization of the SPS notably increases with the number of 
intertripping schemes in order to support larger power transfer 
levels.  
In terms of load shedding exposure, the weighted average 
risk in this set of critical conditions is £36937.1/hour, 
£18196.3/hour and £86572.8/hour for 𝑁 equals to 1, 2 and 7, 
respectively. These values show less risk aversion during 
critical operating conditions for the higher number of wind 
farms connected to the SPS. 
3)   Partial security against SPS failures 
The columns ‘CS’ in Table II are related to the concept of 
‘partial security solutions’, which prevent transmission line 
overloads, and emergency demand curtailments, in post-
contingency scenarios (include SPS failures).
TABLE II.    DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE CRITICAL OPERATING CONDITIONS 
Demand 
(pu) 
Wind 
(pu) 
N = 1 N = 2 N = 7 
T (MW) 𝒮 ≡ (𝑠, 𝑛) 𝑋(£/ℎ) CS T(MW) 𝒮 ≡ (𝑠, 𝑛) 𝑋(£/ℎ) CS T (MW) 𝒮 ≡ (𝑠, 𝑛) 𝑋(£/ℎ) CS 
0.76 0.45 5100 (0,0) 53671 N − 1 5100 (1700,2) 18241 𝑠/  6386 (1800,7) 86610 𝑠~/  
0.76 0.55 5100 (0,0) 53671 N − 1 5100 (1700,2) 18241 𝑠/  6386 (1800,7) 86610 𝑠~/  
1.00 0.55 6200 (1100,1) 130043 𝑠/  6200 (2200,2) 74221 𝑠/  6800 (2380,7) 83480 𝑠~/  
0.76 0.65 4700 (1300,1) 14325 𝑠/  5100 (1700,2) 18241 𝑠/  6386 (1800,7) 86610 𝑠~/  
1.00 0.65 6400 (1300,1) 135954 𝑠/  6000 (2600,2) 26584 𝑠/  6800 (2380,7) 83480 𝑠~/  
0.76 0.75 4900 (1500,1) 15313 𝑠/  5100 (1700,2) 18241 𝑠/  6386 (1800,7) 86610 𝑠~/  
1.00 0.75 6600 (1500,1) 141865 𝑠/  6200 (2800,2) 26584 𝑠/  6800 (2380,7) 83480 𝑠~/  
0.76 0.85 5100 (1700,1) 16301 𝑠/  5100 (1700,1) 16301 𝑠/  6386 (1800,7) 86610 𝑠~/  
1.00 0.85 6800 (1700,1) 147776 𝑠/  6200 (2800,2) 26584 𝑠/  6800 (2380,7) 83480 𝑠~/  
0.76 0.95 5100 (1700,1) 16301 𝑠/  5100 (1700,1) 16301 𝑠/  6386 (1800,7) 86610 𝑠~/  
1.00 0.95 6800 (1700,1) 147776 𝑠/  6200 (2800,2) 26584 𝑠/  6800 (2380,7) 83480 𝑠~/  
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The notation used for the candidate solutions is 𝑠/X , 
where  𝑙 ∈ {1,2} (being 1 and 2 single or double circuit 
outages, respectively), and 𝑚 ∈ {0, … , 𝑛}, corresponds to the 
number of generators that were successfully tripped out of a 
total of 𝑛. For example, the solution 𝑠~/  is characterized by 
preventing post-fault overloads in the loss of a single circuit 
followed by the failure of two intertripping schemes (out of 
seven). ‘N − 1’, on the other hand, denotes the regular ‘N-1’ 
security approach in which the system is resilient against a 
single line outage and the SPS is not utilized. 
In general terms, both N = 1	  and N = 2 exhibit lower risk 
when compared to N = 7 because they present solutions that 
ensure continuity of supply in case of double line outages 
(equivalent to a‘N-2’ security standard), as opposed to N = 7, 
which protects the power system exclusively against single 
line outages (equivalent to a ‘N-1’ security standard). 
However, it should be noted that for N = 7 the risk exposure 
is partially alleviated by selecting two redundant intertripping 
schemes that ensure continuity of supply as long as 5 out of 7 
generators successfully trip in case of a single circuit outage. 
These results demonstrate that, under a probabilistic approach 
to security, redundant SPS configurations can lead the power 
system to larger risk exposure.  
4)   Annual utilisation of the SPS for 𝑁 = 7  
This section looks at the whole operting year in order to 
provide insights into the annual utilization of the intertrippings 
in the case of N=7.  
 
Fig. 5. Annual utilization of the intertripping contracts. 
As shown in Fig. 5 almost half of the year the SPS is not 
operated, and the power system is run under the ‘N-2’ security 
limit. When the SPS is armed, the optimization model selects 
only one intertripping scheme and two intertripping schemes 
5% and 24% of the time, respectively. In other words, for 76% 
of the year contracting two intertripping schemes is sufficient 
to achieve optimal operational solutions, which indicates that 
the value of contracting further intertripping schemes is linked 
a restricted number of hours across the year.  
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper considers the system operator’s decision of 
purchasing multiple intertripping schemes to enhance the 
utilization of the electricity networks. This decision is subject 
to an annual trade-off between capability costs, operational 
benefits, and the risks associated with SPS operation. The 
problem is formulated from a system perspective as the 
probabilistic minimization of intertripping capability fee 
payments, annual generation, protection and loss-of-load costs, 
for a whole operating year. 
A case study based on a simple representation of the Great 
Britain power system is considered. The results show that, 
under a probabilistic security framework, contracting multiple 
intertripping schemes is associated with important annual 
benefits when compared to a traditional power system 
operation under the ‘N-2’ security standard. The decision of 
the system operator to contract one intertripping scheme 
reports the largest operational savings. Nevertheless, 
additional intertripping contracts translated into further annual 
savings, until the 7th contract. The total annual savings with 
respect to the ‘N-2’ base case scenario amount to M£468.8.  
The presented results show that the main operational 
benefits are linked to stressed operating conditions 
characterized by bad weather, high demand and medium/high 
availability of wind outputs. The analysis of these critical 
scenarios show that the optimization model releases further 
transmission capacity with partial security configurations of 
the SPS. In particular, the SPS is configured to ensure 
continuity of supply upon the loss of a single circuit followed 
by the failure of two intertripping schemes (out of seven).  
One may expect that contracting multiple intertrippings 
would reduce the levels of operational risk exposure. However, 
the inspection of the different cost components reveals that this 
is not certainly the case. It is possible then to conclude that, 
under a probabilistic framework to security, redundant SPS 
configurations do not necessarily reduce the operational risks, 
as the system operator’s disposition to take risks increases due 
to the possibility to operate the SPS under partial security 
configurations. 
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